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DISGORGEMENT FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
John D. McCamus*
I. INTRODUCTION
Much controversy surrounds the question of whether the victim
of a breach of contract may seek, as an alternative to the claim for
damages, the remedy of disgorgement of the profits secured through
breach by its perpetrator. Although there is some judicial support in
recent American cases for the proposition that such a remedy is
available,' disgorgement for breach of contract does not yet appear to
be a well-established feature of American private law. Accordingly,
the recent recognition of the availability of such relief as a matter of
English law in the decision of the House of Lords in Attorney
General v. Blake,2 is a development of some interest. This Article
provides a brief account of the doctrinal foundations upon which the
Blake decision was constructed and an analysis of the decision itself.
In addition, it suggests that the disgorgement remedy is likely to play
a peripheral role in contract law, largely at the margins of more
clearly recognized forms of disgorgement liability.
To begin, disgorgement must be located within the existing
remedial scheme for breach of contract. The victim of a breach of
contract is entitled to bring an action for damages against the
perpetrator of the breach. Under well-established principles of
contract law, the recoverable damages in such a claim are
compensatory in nature and are calculated on the basis of the
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
1. See, e.g., Earthinfo, Inc. v. Hydrosphere Res. Consultants, Inc., 900
P.2d 113 (Colo. 1995). See generally, Andrew Kull, Disgorgementfor Breach,
the "Restitution Interest," and the Restatement of Contracts, 79 TEX. L. REV.
2021, 2052-53 (2001) (proposing the hypothesis that disgorgement of profits
secured by breach can be justified in cases where the breach is both profitable
and opportunistic).
2. [2000] 4 All E.R. 385 (H.L.) (Eng.).
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expectancy principle. The plaintiff is entitled to recover an amount
of money which, so far as money can, will place the plaintiff in the
position he would have been in had the defendant fully performed his
contractual obligations.
3
As a general rule, the objective of the damages calculation in
such a claim is compensation for the injury to the expectancy interest
suffered by the victim of the breach.4 As an alternative to the claim
for damages for breach of contract, the victim may be entitled to treat
the contract as discharged by the breach and bring a claim for the
value of benefits that the victim has conferred upon the party in
breach. Some would suggest that the claim in such circumstances,
for the value of money or other benefits conferred by a victim upon
the perpetrator, are recoverable in order to avoid the unjust
enrichment of the perpetrator. 5 The question considered here is
whether, as a further alternative, the victim of a breach of contract
may be entitled to pursue an award, arguably restitutionary in nature,
to recover profits secured by the perpetrator from whatever source
3. See 3 EDWARD ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 188-226 (2d ed.
1998). The same rule applies in common law jurisdictions of the British
Commonwealth. See Keneric Tractor Sales Ltd. v. Langille, [1987] 2 S.C.R.
440 (Can.); Wertheim v. Chicoutimi Pulp Co., [1911] A.C. 301 (P.C. 1910)
(Eng.); Robinson v. Harman, 154 Eng. Rep. 363 (Ex. 1848).
4. In certain circumstances, the victim may be entitled to pursue what may
appear to be an alternate claim for expenditures consumed in preparation for or
performance of the contract. To the extent that such claims are subject to the
expectancy principle-in the sense that if the plaintiff victim is in a "losing"
contract, the "negative" expectancy is deducted from the recovery-it appears
that they do not constitute a significant departure from the expectancy
principle. See Bowlay Logging Ltd. v. Domtar Ltd., [1982] 135 D.L.R. (3d)
179 (B.C. Ct. App.) (Can.); FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 276-79; S. M.
WADDAMS, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 526-28 (4th ed. 1999). Such claims
may give rise, however, to a non-trivial shift in the parties' burdens of proof.
See McRae v. Commonwealth Disposals Comm'n (1950-51) 84 C.L.R. 377
(Austl.). These points will not be further explored here.
5. See, e.g., I GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION ch. 4, at
363-565 (1978). The real test of this thesis is whether the restitution claim is
capped by the expectancy principle. If it is not, the restitution claim stands as
an alternative remedy for which the unjust enrichment principle provides the
plausible explanation. If it is capped, the remedy appears to be contractual in
nature. This too is a controversial point that will not be further explored here.
The cases, however, weigh in heavily on the side of unjust enrichment as an
alternative claim uncapped by the expectancy principle. See id. at 389-409;
PETER D. MADDAUGH & JOHN D. MCCAMUS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 426-
29 (1990).
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through the breach of contract; that is, whether disgorgement of the
gains that the party in default made as a result of the breach is
proper.
Restitution scholars are likely to welcome the Blake decision as
an addition to the existing stable of claims for disgorgement of the
profits of wrongdoing, which are typically classified in contemporary
accounts of the law of restitution as being restitutionary in nature.
6
They are typically explained as applications of the restitutionary sub-
principle that "a person shall not be permitted to profit from his
wrongdoing." 7 Thus, persons who breach their fiduciary duties may
be liable to disgorge all of the profits secured by this conduct, even
though those profits cannot be matched with corresponding out-of-
pocket expenses or other losses sustained by the plaintiff. Similarly,
victims of tortious wrongs may "waive the tort" and sue in restitution
for the profits secured by the wrongdoing. Disgorgement relief is
available to lift the profits of breaches of confidence and, although
the point is a difficult one, the profits of crime to some extent.
In the present context, then, should the disgorgement principle
be available to the victim of a breach of contract on the theory that
the commission of such a breach always, or at least in some cases,
may constitute conduct that is wrongful in the requisite sense? This
issue has been the subject of much academic8 and judicial discussion
6. See generally ANDREW BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 376-419
(1993) (analyzing unjust enrichment by wrongdoing); LORD GOFF OF
CHIEVELEY & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 709-816 (5th ed.
1998) (examining situations where the defendant has acquired a benefit
through his own wrongful act and the resulting restitutionary claims against
such wrongdoers); MADDAUGH & MCCAMUS, supra note 5, at 483-679
(discussing criminal and quasi-criminal acts, waiver of tort, compulsion,
breach of fiduciary duty, unconscionable transactions, and other equitable
wrongdoing); GRAHAM GILL VIRGO, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION 445-588 (1999).
7. See, e.g., Halifax Bldg. Soc'y v. Thomas, [1995] 4 All E.R. 673, 682
(C.A.) (Eng.).
8. See generally JACK BEATSON, THE USE AND ABUSE OF UNJUST
ENRICHMENT 15-17 (1991) (discussing recovery of defendant's gains from
breach of contract); JAMES EDELMAN, GAIN-BASED DAMAGES: CONTRACT,
TORT, EQUITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 149-89 (2002) [hereinafter
GAIN-BASED DAMAGES] (analyzing Attorney Gen. v. Blake and proclaiming it
a watershed case in restitution law); S. M. Waddams, Restitution as Part of
Contract Law, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 197, 207-13 (Andrew
S. Burrows ed., 1991) (discussing the ways contract and restitution law are
intertwined); Peter Birks, Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract:
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in recent years. The recent decision of the House of Lords in Blake
was much anticipated. Before turning to a consideration of the Blake
case itself, it is useful to briefly present the arguments for and against
disgorgement relief in the context of breach of contract, and to
Snepp and the Fusion of Law and Equity, 1987 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q.
421, 442 (arguing that restitutionary damages should only be available if
compensatory damages are insufficient); Andrew S. Burrows, No
Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract, 1993 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM.
L.Q. 453 (analyzing two English cases that directly address whether or not
restitutionary damages can be awarded for breach of contract); M. Chen-
Wishart, Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract, 114 L.Q. REV. 363
(1998) (discussing the incompatibility between protecting the plaintiff by
removing the defendant's incentive for breach and not wanting to discourage
the defendant from making an efficient breach); James Edelman,
Restitutionary Damages and Disgorgement Damages for Breach of Contract,
2000 RESTITUTION L. REV. 129 [hereinafter Restitutionary Damages] (arguing
that "[d]isgorgement damages should be available where a defendant has
deliberately breached a contract to make a profit but the amount of the profit of
which the defendant should be stripped should only be that which directly
relates to the breach."); Edward Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The
Dilemma of the Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J.
1339, 1341 (1985) (arguing that although the "disgorgement principle" is not
sound as a general proposition, there is a case for its limited application);
Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation
of Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504 (1980)
(stating that restitutionary claims are appropriate in many cases where one
person appropriates the interests of another); William Goodhart, Restitutionary
Damages for Breach of Contract: The Remedy that Dare Not Speak its Name,
1995 RESTITUTION L. REV. 3, 14 (proposing legislation and the appeals
process as two possible ways to make restitution a breach of contract remedy
and arguing that there is no logical or practical reason to severely restrict
restitution as a remedy for breach of contract); Peter Jaffey, Restitutionary
Damages and Disgorgement, 1995 RESTITUTION L. REV. 30 (detailing the
distinctions between different notions of restitutionary damages and
advocating for maintaining those distinctions); Gareth Jones, The Recovery of
Benefits Gained from a Breach of Contract, 99 L.Q. REV. 443 (1983)
(describing various English and American cases where courts decided how
much a plaintiff lost based in part on whether the defendant benefited); Kull,
supra note I (explaining that some recent cases further the proposition that a
material breach of contract makes the defendant liable to disgorge the benefits
realized as a result of the plaintiff's performance); Janet O'Sullivan, Loss and
Gain at Greater Depth: The Implications of the Ruxley Decision, in FAILURE
OF CONTRACTS: CONTRACTUAL RESTITUTIONARY AND PROPRIETARY
CONSEQUENCES I (Francis Rose ed., 1997) (discussing Ruxley in the context
of domestic building work and non-commercial transactions); Lionel D. Smith,
Disgorgement of the Profits of Breach of Contract: Property, Contract and
"Efficient Breach", 24 CAN. Bus. L.J. 121 (1994-95) (discussing whether
disgorgement is available for breach of contract).
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provide an account of the pre-Blake jurisprudence, which arguably
extended beyond expectancy damages to reach gains secured by the
perpetrator through breach of contract.
II. THE DISGORGEMENT DEBATE
Although an award of damages for breach of contract often
forces the defendant to disgorge profits resulting from the breach,9
this is not invariably so. Hence, where the breach of contract creates
opportunities for profit-taking that would not have existed but for the
breach, the plaintiff's damages in the contractual expectancy
measure may not equal the defendant's gain.
The factual background of the Blake decision provides a useful
and colorful illustration of this point. George Blake had been a
member of the British security and intelligence services from 1944 to
1961. He became an agent for the Soviet Union in 1951 and
provided information to the Soviet government over the next nine
years. When his treachery was uncovered, Blake was convicted of
five charges under the Official Secrets Actl° and sentenced to forty-
two years of imprisonment. Blake escaped from prison in 1966 and
fled to Berlin, and then to Moscow, where he wrote an
autobiography recounting his exploits as a spy. In 1989, Blake
entered into a publishing contract with the publisher Jonathan Cape,
Ltd. The contract provided that he would receive 50,000 pounds
upon signing and two further installments of the same amount upon
delivery of the manuscript and publication. The Attorney General
became aware of this publishing event only upon publication of the
volume, entitled "No Other Choice," in the fall of 1990. By the time
the Attorney General commenced an action against Blake and the
publisher, Blake had received approximately 60,000 pounds and was
waiting for payment of the remaining 90,000 pounds due to him
under the agreement.
By writing and agreeing to publish the volume, Blake clearly
violated his employment contract with the Crown, in which he
agreed "'not to divulge any official information gained by [him] as a
9. Thus, where a seller, A, repudiates a contract to sell goods to B at less
than the market price in order to resell the goods to C at the market price, B's
contract damages claim will yield an amount equivalent to the extra profits
earned by A on the sale to C.
10. Official Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 28, § 1(1)(c) (Eng.).
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result of [his] employment, either in the press or in book form.""'
Thus, the Attorney General was certainly entitled to bring a claim
against Blake for damages for breach of contract. If damages were
to be calculated on the basis of the expectancy principle, however,
the Crown would not be able to establish a compensable loss. If
Blake had performed his agreement with the Crown, he would not
have written and published the book and he would not have earned
any royalties. Thus, an award sufficient to place the Crown in the
position in which it would have been had Blake performed his
agreement would be nil or merely nominal damages. At the same
time, however, the evident injustice of allowing Blake to profit from
his treachery in this way raised, in an appealing manner, the issue of
whether an alternative claim for disgorgement of his ill-gotten gains
should be permitted.
The traditional common law approach is that relief in the
disgorgement measure is not available in a claim for damages for
breach of contract.12 A number of justifications for the traditional
approach exist. Some draw support from the views expressed by
Oliver Wendell Holmes that the nature of a duty to perform a
contractual obligation at common law is nothing more than "a
prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,-and
nothing else."' 13  Holmes conceded that this view "stinks in the
nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much ethics into
the law as they can."' 14 To the extent that the Holmesian view
involves the simple assertion that this is the nature of the obligation
imposed by a contractual doctrine, it is a circular and unconvincing
argument.
Implicit in this view, however, is a more persuasive justification
for the traditional approach. Many breaches of contract are innocent
in a moral sense. People who have acted in good faith and who have
attempted to perform their agreements may nonetheless fail to do so.
In such cases, compensatory damages would appear to be sufficient
11. Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [2000] 4 All E.R. 385, 390 (H.L.) (Eng.)
(quoting a declaration that Blake signed in 1944).
12. This view was reaffirmed by Sir Robert Megarry, V.C., in Tito v.
Waddell (No. 2), [1977] 1 Ch. 106, 332 (Ch. App.) (Eng.). See also Asamera
Oil Corp. Ltd. v. Sea Oil & Gen. Corp., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 633, 673 (Can.).
13. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457,
462 (1897).
14. Id.
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and just. More burdensome awards might arguably be appropriate,
however, where the perpetrator has acted in bad faith. If the measure
of relief in a contract claim depends on whether the perpetrator of a
breach has acted in a wholesome rather than an objectionable way, a
test of uncertain application is introduced into the law of contract.
By requiring compensation alone as the measure of relief, such
inquiries are avoided. Holmes, presumably, would agree that this is
desirable. This point less troubles those who favor recognition of the
disgorgement measure of relief. Some, though not all, would
recommend that the test for the availability of disgorgement be the
moral quality of the perpetrator's breach of contract. 
15
In any event, the increasing willingness of courts to imply
requirements that parties to agreements act in good faith,'6 and the
recognition (at least under Canadian common law) that punitive
damages may be awarded for breach of contract, suggests that
judicial evaluation of the moral quality of the conduct of defaulting
parties is not precluded in the contractual context.17 At the same
time, however, there appears to be little support for the notion that
the disgorgement measure is universally available. Accordingly, a
test for identifying appropriate cases must be constructed. As a
result, the problem of uncertainty cannot be forced to completely
disappear.
Contemporary law and economics scholars have provided a
further justification for the traditional approach. 18 Under the theory
15. See, e.g., Birks, supra note 8.
16. See Shannon Kathleen O'Byme, Good Faith in Contractual
Performance: Recent Developments, 74 CAN. BAR REv. 70, 93-94 (1995); cf
Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701, 749 (Can.)
(concluding that, in a wrongful dismissal case, damages for breach of an
implied obligation of good faith are not recoverable, but that a bad faith
dismissal could, in effect, be compensated by extending the length of the
period of reasonable notice). See generally GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN
CONTRACT LAW (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995) (collection of
scholarly essays examining the role of good faith in contract formation, breach,
remedies, and contractual obligations in general).
17. In any event, the strict divide between ethics and contract law envisaged
by Holmes was undoubtedly a distortion of the reality, as Pollock observed in
correspondence with Holmes at the time. See S. M. Waddams, Breach of
Contract and the Concept of Wrongdoing, 12 SUP. CT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
18. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 130-40 (5th
ed. 1998); see also Sidney W. DeLong, The Efficiency of a Disgorgement as a
Remedy for Breach of Contract, 22 IND. L. REv. 737 (1989) (exploring certain
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of so-called efficient breach, it is argued that there is a positive value
in structuring the law of contract damages to facilitate, if not
encourage, contract breaches that will lead to efficient behavior.
Thus, where a seller of widgets discovers that a second purchaser is
willing to pay a significantly higher price than the first purchaser to
whom he is contractually bound, the seller should be encouraged to
breach the contract and sell the widgets to the second purchaser who
evidently places a higher value on the widgets. Provided that the
first purchaser is compensated by expectancy damages, the net
wealth of society arguably has been increased by the breach of
contract. The seller is better off, the second purchaser is better off,
and the first purchaser has suffered an injury that has been fully
compensated. The theory holds that this opportunity for an
efficiency gain will be lost if the seller is required to negotiate and
purchase a release from the first purchaser. Accordingly, the seller is
permitted to act unilaterally. A principle that stripped the seller of
profits made on the second sale would discourage efficient behavior
of this kind.
The theory of efficient breach has its critics.19  Typical
criticisms include the suggestion that the supposed efficiency gains
are illusory because they fail to take into account the potential costs
of resolving the seller's likely dispute with the first purchaser, as
well as the more general point that the theory fails to accommodate
the need to encourage contractual performance. Moreover, one of
the leading exponents of the theory has taken the view that an
exception should be made for "opportunistic" breaches of contract,
for which disgorgement is the appropriate remedy.2 ° On this view,
opportunistic breach is distinguishable from efficient breach. Where,
for example, a seller accepts payment and then profitably invests the
price but refuses to deliver the goods, the breach is merely
"opportunistic" if the seller does not sell the goods to a higher
situations in which disgorgement appears to be an efficient remedy for breach
of contract).
19. See Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1989); Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the
Sky, 68 VA. L. REv. 947 (1982); Richard O'Dair, Restitutionary Damages for
Breach of Contract and the Theory of Efficient Breach: Some Reflections, 46
CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 113 (1993); Restitutionary Damages, supra note
8; Smith, supra note 8.
20. See POSNER, supra note 18, at 130-31.
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bidder. With no efficiency gain, awarding disgorgement relief and
capturing the profits made by the seller through this opportunistic
behavior should discourage the behavior. Critics see this move,
perhaps unconvincingly, as an unraveling of the theory.
21
In short, the theory remains controversial. It therefore appears
unlikely that the future of the disgorgement remedy in contract will
rest on the development of a judicial or academic consensus on the
validity of the theory of efficient breach. Even detractors of the
theory of efficient breach, however, might agree with the notion that
disgorgement damages for breach, if widely available, may "have a
tendency to discourage economic activity in relevant situations. ' 22
A further argument in support of the traditional approach is that
the general availability of disgorgement relief would undermine the
principle that the victim of a breach of contract has a duty to mitigate
loss. 23 Under present law, if a seller fails to deliver goods which are
readily available in the marketplace, the purchaser is under a
virtually immediate obligation to seek substitute goods in the market,
thus restricting the claim of expectancy damages to the difference
between the contract price and the market price at the date of breach.
If the buyer was entitled to relief in the disgorgement measure,
however, the buyer could decline to mitigate and subsequently claim
either the seller's profits as a result of resale or the value of the goods
at the date of judgment, if the seller retained them. Though the
prudent purchaser might mitigate in any event, granting
disgorgement relief might work against the mitigation principle in
specific factual contexts.
An argument in support of the availability of disgorgement is the
general principle that "a wrongdoer should not be allowed to profit
from his wrongs., 24 When this principle is applied in analogous
contexts, it has the effect of granting disgorgement relief. If
21. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 8, at 133-35.
22. Surrey County Council v. Bredero Homes Ltd., [1993] 1 W.L.R. 1361,
1370 (C.A.) (Eng.).
23. See Waddams, supra note 17, at 9; LAw COMMISSION, AGGRAVATED,
EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES Com. 247, at 3.46 (1997),
available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/library/lib-com.htm#1iblc247 (last
visited Oct. 19, 2002); see also Restitutionary Damages, supra note 8, at 148-
49.
24. See, e.g., Halifax Bldg. Soc'y v. Thomas, [1995] 4 All E.R. 673 (C.A.)
(Eng.).
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disgorgement remedies are available for breach of fiduciary
obligation, breach of confidence, and tortious wrongdoing, it is
unclear why similar relief should not be available in the context of
contractual breach. Disgorgement relief in the context of tortious
wrongdoing and, to some extent, in contractual settings has been
permitted in order to protect proprietary interests. It may be difficult
to articulate a basis for protecting proprietary interests in this way
while refusing to protect contractual rights in the same manner.26 A
refusal to grant disgorgement relief simply permits the perpetrator to
"expropriate" the contractual rights of the promisee. This argument
may be particularly compelling in the context of cases such as Blake,
where the expectancy measure of relief yields no compensation
whatsoever. Further, it has been suggested that the impulse to grant
disgorgement relief to meet the justice of an individual case is so
strong that courts have, at times, distorted and instrumentally
deployed such concepts as fiduciary obligation and compensation in
order to indirectly achieve such results.27 According to this view,
more open recognition of the availability of disgorgement relief for
breach of contract facilitates clearer thinking about the circumstances
in which such relief should be made available.
In sum, there appear to be plausible arguments both for and
against recognition of disgorgement relief for breach of contract. It
is not surprising, therefore, that the point has proven to be a
controversial one. The merits of these contending views can perhaps
best be tested in the light of cases that consider granting such relief, a
matter to which we now turn.
III. BEYOND COMPENSATION: THE EXISTING DOCTRINE
In the case law preceding the decision of the House of Lords in
Blake, there appears to have been no direct authority for the
proposition that one may, in effect, "waive the breach of contract"
25. See Reading v. Attorney-Gen., [1951] A.C. 507 (H.L.) (Eng.). The
relationship between the employment contract and the duty of confidence is
explored in Faccenda Chicken Ltd. v. Fowler, [1987] 1 Ch. 117 (Ch. App.
1985) (Eng.). Waiver of tort is, in my view, the most attractive explanation for
the result in Penarth Dock Eng'g Co. v. Pounds, [1963] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 359
(Q.B.) (Eng.) (claim in contract and in trespass--disgorgement measure
applied).
26. See Smith, supra note 8, at 129-32.
27. See id. at 126-29.
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and sue in restitution in the disgorgement measure. 28 Nonetheless,
there are a number of cases allowing relief for breach of contract,
which cannot be easily explained on the basis of the expectancy
principle, in which awards calculated on the basis of the perpetrator's
gain (as opposed to the victim's loss) have been granted. 29 First, the
disgorgement claim in the breach of contract context is on its
strongest foundation when the breach of contract also constitutes a
breach of another duty which has traditionally given rise to a
restitutionary claim in this measure. Thus, where a breach of
contract also constitutes breach of fiduciary obligation, tort, or
breach of confidence, a claim for disgorgement may lie.
In the Blake case, the House of Lords was of the view that Blake
was not in breach of a fiduciary obligation owed to the Crown and
that the information, at the date of his disclosure, did not possess the
requisite degree of confidentiality to provide a foundation for a claim
for breach of a duty of confidence. 30
On the very similar facts of Attorney-General v. Observer Ltd. ,
however, the possibility of a breach of confidence claim was
suggested.32 In this case, the offending author had moved to
Australia and was no longer amenable to suit.33 Lord Goff indicated
that the author would, if sued, be liable for an accounting of profits
for his breach of confidence.
34
On similar facts in the American case of Snepp v. United
States,35 the Supreme Court held that an equivalent literary effort by
a former member of the Central Intelligence Agency constituted a
breach of his fiduciary obligations to his employer. 36 The profits
earned thereby were impressed with a constructive trust.37 The fact
that the disgorgement principle is applicable in the case of the breach
of independent duties of this kind does not, however, significantly
advance the argument that restitutionary disgorgement may be
28. See Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [2000] 4 All E.R. 385, 393, 396 (H.L.)
(Eng.).
29. See id. at 396.
30. See id. at 399.
31. [1988] 3 W.L.R. 776 (H.L.) (Eng.).
32. See id. at 786.
33. See id. at 780.
34. See id. at 812.
35. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
36. Seeid. at510.
37. See id. at 516.
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available as a remedy for breach of contract simpliciter. Rather, it
may be taken to confirm the unexceptional proposition that, where
the party in default is concurrently liable for breach of a fiduciary
obligation, for example, the innocent party is able to choose the most
advantageous theory of liability. There are other decisions, however,
that cannot be explained on this basis.
In some cases in which the disgorgement measure has been
utilized, albeit for the purpose of calculating contractual damages,
the interest of the plaintiff injured by the defendant's breach may be
said to be proprietary in character. Thus, in Lake v. Bayliss,38 it was
held that where a vendor, having contracted to sell land to the
plaintiff, repudiates the agreement and sells the land to a third party,
the vendor will hold the proceeds of the sale to a third party in a
constructive trust for the plaintiff. The defendant vendor's argument
that the plaintiff should be restricted to damages was rejected on the
basis that the vendor, upon entering a contract of sale, holds the
property in question as trustee for the purchaser.
39
A different type of proprietary interest was protected by relief in
the disgorgement measure in Wrotham Park Estate Co. v. Parkside
Homes Ltd.4 In that case, a developer had purchased land with a
view to its development for residential purposes.41 The land was
subject to a restrictive covenant prohibiting such development.42
Once development began, the plaintiffs, who were the successors in
title of the original vendors, drew the attention of the developer to
the covenant.43 The developer replied that it had been advised the
covenant was unenforceable and continued to implement its plans.
44
Some weeks later, the plaintiff brought an action seeking a
mandatory injunction for the demolition of buildings erected in
breach of the covenant. 45 That relief was refused on the ground that
it would be "an unpardonable waste of much needed houses., 46 On
the other hand, the court held that the plaintiff was not restricted to
38. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1073, 1076 (Ch.) (Eng.).
39. See id.
40. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 798 (Ch. 1973) (Eng.).
41. See id. at 803.
42. See id. at 802.
43. See id. at 804.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. Id. at811.
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damages in the contractual measure in the form of compensation for
the injuries sustained by its land, which were insubstantial, for that
would leave the defendant "in undisturbed possession of the fruits of
their wrongdoing. 47 Rather, the plaintiff could recover the profit
garnered by this breach of duty, which the court assessed as "such a
sum of money as might reasonably have been demanded by the
plaintiffs from [the defendant] as a quid pro quo for relaxing the
covenant."
48
Although the holding in Wrotham Park proved to be the subject
of controversy in subsequent English decisions, the approach
adopted by the court in that case received the approval of the House
of Lords in Blake. However, in Surrey County Council v. Bredero
Homes Ltd. , on facts rather similar to those of Wrotham Park, the
Court of Appeal declined to apply the Wrotham Park principle.
5 °
The defendant developer had acquired two contiguous parcels of
land from the two plaintiff municipal councils on the basis of an
explicit understanding that the defendant would erect a housing
estate containing a fixed number of units. 5' In breach of this
undertaking, the defendant ultimately obtained planning permission
to build more houses on the parcels and proceeded to do so, thereby
securing a greater profit from the development than originally
envisaged.
52
47. Id. at 812.
48. Id. at 815. Farnsworth refers to this measure of relief as measurement
in terms of "saving of the cost of modification" of the original agreement.
Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 1346. He prefers it to the granting of recovery of
all of the profits made by the subsequent conduct flowing from the breach
because it is more narrowly restricted to that portion of the subsequent profit
that can be said to be directly caused by the breach. See id. at 1347. The
"saving of the cost of modification" is one example of a broader concept of
"saving of the cost of other means" of securing the profit. Id. A second type,
"saving of the cost substitution," is illustrated in cases where the breach
involves resale to a third party of goods promised to the plaintiff. See id. at
1345. The appropriate measure in such cases would be, in Farnsworth's view,
not the full profit on the resale but the cost of obtaining substitute goods, on
the theory that any profit beyond that figure is, again, not strictly caused by the
breach. See id.
49. [1993] 1 W.L.R. 1361 (C.A.) (Eng.).
50. See id. at 1367-68.
51. See id. at 1363.
52. See id.
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Although the councils had not suffered losses compensable on
the basis of the expectancy principle, relying on the decision in
Wrotham Park, they sought an award that would represent a
premium that could reasonably have been charged by them for
permission to relax the contractual understandings concerning the
restriction on the number of units to be constructed.53 The Court of
Appeal rejected this claim and awarded merely nominal damages. 54
Lord Justice Dillon rejected the approach taken in Wrotham Park on
the basis that the general principle for the assessment of damages in a
contract case is compensatory in nature. 55 The claim advanced by
the plaintiff, although characterized by counsel for the plaintiff as
"compensation" for the plaintiffs lost opportunity to extract such a
premium, was considered by Lord Justice Dillon to represent a claim
for the profit made by the defendant by breaching its undertaking and
therefore represented an unacceptable departure from the
compensation principle.56 Lord Justice Steyn, on the other hand,
accepted the validity of the approach taken in Wrotham Park as a
useful development in the law designed to protect against the
invasion of property rights, but nonetheless distinguished Wrotham
Park, as did Lord Justice Rose, on grounds that appear to be both
narrow and obscure.
57
The tension between the holdings in Wrotham Park and Surrey
County Council surfaced for reconsideration by the Court of Appeal
in Jaggard v. Sawyer58 and in the House of Lords in Blake.59 In
Jaggard the claim concerned a breach of a covenant not to use a
53. See id. at 1363-64.
54. See id. at 1368.
55. See id. at 1367.
56. See id. at 1368.
57. For Lord Justice Steyn here, unlike in Wrotham Park, there was no
attempted invasion of property rights. See id. at 1369-70 (Steyn, L.J.,
concurring). This distinction rests, presumably, on the fact that the restriction
on development was contained in a restrictive covenant in Wrotham Park, but
in a mere contractual undertaking in Surrey County Council. See id. This
distinction neatly illustrates the artificiality of a distinction between proprietary
and non-proprietary interests for disgorgement purposes. See Smith, supra
note 8. For Lord Justice Rose, Wrotham Park was distinguished because,
unlike the present case, the plaintiff had objected to what the defendants did
from first to last. See Surrey County Council, [1993] 1 W.L.R. at 1371 (Rose,
L.J., concurring).
58. [1995] 1 W.L.R. 269 (C.A. 1994) (Eng.).
59. [2000] 4 All E.R. 385 (H.L.) (Eng.).
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portion of land other than as a private garden.60 The defendant had
constructed a driveway over part of the land subject to the
restriction.61 The trial judge followed Wrotham Park and awarded
an amount which the plaintiff could have reasonably expected to
receive for release of the covenant. 62 The Court of Appeal agreed
with this approach and approved the decision in Wrotham Park,
although it chose to explain Wrotham Park as a case based on
compensatory principles, the plaintiff being compensated for a
continuing invasion of his contractual right.63 As others have noted,
however, it is difficult to justify the award in Wrotham Park on this
basis. 64 If the defendant had performed his contractual undertaking,
the plaintiff would have suffered no loss. In Blake, the House of
Lords correctly explained the result in Wrotham Park on the basis of
the disgorgement principle.65  The Wrotham Park principle was
adopted by the British Columbia Supreme Court in Arbutus Park
Estates Ltd. v. Fuller.66 In that case, the court awarded damages in a
similar measure for failure to comply with a restrictive covenant
prohibiting the building of a "detached garage" until the plans and
specifications for its erection were approved by the plaintiff.
67
Injunctive relief was denied, but the plaintiff was allowed to recover
the amount which the defendant had saved by failing to hire an
architect to prepare the required plans.
68
In this line of cases, the courts manipulated the concept of
"compensation" or "damages" in order to award disgorgement relief.
In other cases, they utilized the concept of trust in what appeared to
be an instrumental way in order to achieve a disgorgement award for
breach of contract. Thus, in Reid-Newfoundland Co. v. Anglo-
American Telegraph Co.,69 the Privy Council awarded a
disgorgement recovery for expenses saved by unauthorized use of a
telegraph line. Under an agreement with the plaintiff telegraph
60. See Jaggard, [1995] 1 W.L.R. at 272.
61. See id. at 273.
62. See id. at 275.
63. See id. at 278-82.
64. See, e.g., Goodhart, supra note 8, at 7-8.
65. See Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [2000] 4 All E.R. 385, 395 (H.L.) (Eng.).
66. [1976] 74 D.L.R. (3d) 257 (B.C. Sup. Ct.) (Can.).
67. See id. at 258.
68. See id. at 265-66.
69. [1912] A.C. 555 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Nfld.) (Can.).
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company, a Newfoundland railway company was entitled to access a
telegraph line for certain limited purposes. In breach of the
agreement, the defendant utilized the line for its own commercial
purposes in a more general way. Relying on a contractual provision
that stipulated that the company would "'not pass or transmit any
commercial messages over the said special wire, except for the
benefit and account of the telegraph company,"' 70 the Privy Council
held that "an obligation in the nature of a trust arose" and that the
defendant had a duty to set aside profits accruing from such use, as
they belonged to the plaintiffs. 7' In Blake, the House of Lords cited
Reid-Newfoundland as an illustration of disgorgement relief for
breach of contract to which the court "attached a different label."
72
In the cases considered above, a potentially unifying theme may
be the use of a disgorgement measure to protect proprietary interests.
One might ask, then, whether disgorgement relief may be, or should
be, restricted to such cases or, alternatively, whether these cases
provide a foundation for a broader view of the availability of
disgorgement relief for breach of contract.
It is difficult, however, to build an argument for the general
availability of restitutionary disgorgement relief in breach of contract
cases based on decisions dealing with proprietary interests. The
special nature of such interests is well recognized. They are typically
protected by equitable decrees for specific performance and
injunctions on the basis that the normal damages claim at common
law is inadequate to protect such interests. The use of the
disgorgement measure may thus be seen as an alternate means of
responding to this problem of inadequacy in situations, such as those
just discussed, in which the granting of equitable relief is either
impossible or, for other reasons, unattractive.
If the availability of disgorgement in the service of proprietary
interests does not lead inescapably to the conclusion that the remedy
should be available more generally, it would, on the other hand, be
difficult to defend the proposition that disgorgement should be
limited to such situations. As the decisions in Wrotham Park and
Surrey County Council demonstrate, the distinction between
proprietary and non-proprietary interests is, for present purposes at
70. Id. at 558 (quoting the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant).
71. Id. at 559.
72. Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [2000] 4 All E.R. 385 (H.L.) (Eng.).
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least, a very narrow and arguably artificial one. The restriction on
development in Wrotham Park, which was set out in the restrictive
covenant, had a proprietary character, whereas the mere contractual
undertaking in Surrey County Council did not.
73
One might justify the relief granted in the property cases on the
basis that the disgorgement measure is being used in these cases to
respond to situations where compensatory damages are inadequate or
where equitable relief, which might otherwise correct the
inadequacy, is for some reason unavailable. It must be noted
however, that the problem of inadequacy may arise in situations
which do not involve the invasion of proprietary rights.
This point is well illustrated in British Motor Trade Association
v. Gilbert,74 a case in which the disgorgement measure was used but
no proprietary interest was involved. In that case, the defendant
purchased a new motor car and entered into a deed of covenant with
the plaintiffs and the dealer which required the defendant to sell the
vehicle only to the plaintiffs during the first two years of
ownership.75 The creation of such covenants by the Association was
part of a scheme designed to restrain the inflation of prices of new
cars during a period of shortage. 76 In turn, the Association would
resell any cars sold to it at a price calculated by deducting a
stipulated rate of depreciation from the original sale price.
In breach of the covenant, the defendant sold his new car on the
black market for a handsome profit.77 The plaintiffs brought an
action for damages and the defendant argued that the plaintiffs
should be restricted to the contractual measure of relief which, in
these circumstances, would yield no damages at all.78 The court held
that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the profits earned by the
defendant through his breach.79 The explanation offered for this
holding, however, was that the plaintiffs should be able to take into
account the cost of substitution. The Court allowed substitution even
though the relevant market price was established by surreptitious
73. See Surrey County Council v. Bredero Homes Ltd., [1993] 1 W.L.R.
1361, 1367-68 (C.A.) (Eng.).
74. [1951] 2 All E.R. 641 (Ch.) (Eng.).
75. See id. at 643.
76. See id. at 644.
77. See id. at 641.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 645.
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evasion of the plaintiffs' scheme, and even though this would enable
the plaintiffs to recover damages in an amount which exceeded that
which they would have obtained if the defendant had complied with
his contractual obligations.
80
The court held that the covenant itself was not an improper
restraint on trade since it was appropriately designed to protect the
interests of the public and honest dealers in the motor trade.81
Presumably, therefore, this is an agreement which could have been
enforced by injunctive relief had the sale been anticipated.
Furthermore, it appears evident that the traditional measure of
contractual damages did not adequately protect plaintiffs' legitimate
interests.
The traditional pre-Blake doctrine may have been seen as
somewhat inhospitable to the disgorgement measure in breach of
contract cases. However, in recent years there has been some
academic support for a limited extension of the disgorgement
principle, though opinion is divided on the manner and extent to
which such a development would be desirable. Some have
recommended recognition of discretion to grant relief in the
disgorgement measure in cases of cynical or unscrupulous breach of
contract.8 2  Another has suggested an expansion of the kinds of
proprietary interests that would attract such protection. 3  A third
suggestion is that the main contribution the disgorgement principle
makes in contractual cases is to provide a basis for granting the
higher measure of relief in cases like Tito v. Waddell (No. 2),84 where
80. See id. at 644.
81. See id.
82. See, e.g., PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION 334-36 (1985); cf LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY & GARETH JONES,
THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 709-816 (4th ed. 1998) (examining situations
where the defendant has acquired a benefit through his own wrongful act and
the resulting restitutionary claims against such wrongdoers).
83. See Friedmann, supra note 8.
84. [1977] 1 Ch. 106 (Eng.). In this case, the defendant secured the right to
mine phosphate in a South Pacific island on the condition that the land would
be restored and replanted after the completion of the mining. The defendant
failed to do so and the plaintiff sought damages in a rather substantial amount
to reflect the cost of performing this task. The defendant successfully argued
that the plaintiffs expectancy would more fairly be measured in a lesser
amount, which reflected the diminution in the value of the island caused by
this breach. See id. at 332. Farnsworth characterizes such situations as "abuse
of contract" and recommends relief in the "saving of the cost of modification"
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the expectancy principle applies ambiguously and offers two
different methods for calculating damages.
Persuasive criticism of the first two proposals exists. It does not
appear to be either practical or desirable to implement a distinction
between cynical and acceptable breaches of contract for these
purposes. 85  Furthermore, expanding the notion of proprietary
interests for these purposes appears likely to lead to an artificial and
unfruitful analysis. 86  Moreover, the general assumption that
proprietary interests must automatically be protected in this way is a
questionable one.
Therefore, the test of inadequacy of damages at common law is
arguably a more accurate indicator of the appropriateness of
disgorgement relief.87  Plainly, however, the restitutionary
disgorgement claim is most securely grounded when it rests upon an
independent and concurrent breach of restitutionary obligation
which, for reasons other than the mere fact the conduct also
constitutes a breach of contract, engages the restitutionary principle
that a wrongdoer shall not profit from his wrongdoing. However,
adopting restrictions on the availability of disgorgement to situations
identified by suggestions such as these was not embraced by the
House of Lords in Blake. Whether they may continue to point in the
direction of the future availability of disgorgement remains an open
question.
IV. THE OPEN-TEXTURED APPROACH: ATTORNEY GENERAL v. BLAKE
The facts of the Blake case have been recounted above.88 At
trial, the Crown framed its claim exclusively on the basis that the
writing and publication of Blake's book constituted a breach of a
measure. Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 1343-45, 1387-91. A second situation
in which this concept would apply, in his view, is where a builder, through
substitution of cheaper materials, has enjoyed savings that exceed the resulting
diminution of the value of the completed work. See id. at 1382-87. See
generally Frank Zaid, Conflict in the Measure of Contract Damages-Cost of
Performance (Replacement) Versus Difference in Value (Indemnity), 9
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 179, 180-84 (1971) (discussing Canadian cases involving
this type of conflict).
85. See ANDREW S. BURROWS, REMEDIES FOR TORTS AND BREACH OF
CONTRACT 270-75 (Butterworths 1987).
86. See Farnsworth, supra note 8, at 1343 n.9.
87. See, e.g., BEATSON, supra note 8, at 17.
88. See discussion supra Part II.
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fiduciary obligation he owed to the Crown.89 The claim for breach
of fiduciary obligation failed at trial and in the Court of Appeal, 90
and was not pursued before the House of Lords. The Court of
Appeal, however, allowed the Crown to amend its claim to assert a
public law claim which, although it would achieve a similar result,
the Attorney General undertook "as guardian of the public
interest."9' This claim succeeded before the Court of Appeal. 92
At the same time, the court indicated an interest in the
possibility of a private law claim for damages for breach of Blake's
obligation to refrain from divulging official information in which
disgorgement of the royalties would be the appropriate measure of
relief.93 Although this claim was not pursued by the Crown before
the Court of Appeal, it was advanced before the House of Lords
where it enjoyed success.
94
In the leading opinion, Lord Nicholls 95 reviewed the various
lines of authority, including breach of fiduciary obligation, waiver of
tort, and the kinds of authorities concerning breach of contract
described above, in which courts have granted awards which have
the effect of disgorging gains secured through the breach of private
law duties. Having observed that a number of these doctrines arose
in the context of awarding financial recompense for interference with
property rights, Lord Nicholls went on to note, however, that "it is
not clear why it should be any more permissible to expropriate
personal rights than it is permissible to expropriate property rights."
96
Further, relying, inter alia, on cases such as British Motor Trade
Association v. Gilbert, Lord Nicholls concluded that such cases
"illustrate that circumstances do arise when the just response to a
breach of contract is that the wrongdoer should not be permitted to
retain any profit from the breach.,
97
89. See Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [1996] 3 All E.R. 903 (Ch.) (Eng.).
90. See Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [1998] 1 All E.R. 833 (C.A. 1997) (Eng.).
91. Id. at 833.
92. See id. at 847.
93. See id. at 843-44.
94. See Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [2000] 4 All E.R. 385 (H.L.) (Eng.).
95. With whom Lords Goff and Browne-Wilkinson concurred. Lord Steyn
wrote a separate concurring opinion. Lord Hobhouse dissented. See id. at 395.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 397.
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Although the expression "restitutionary damages" was
considered to be an "unhappy" one, Lord Nicholls concluded that
there "seems to be no reason, in principle, why the court must in all
circumstances rule out an account of profits as a remedy for breach
of contract." 98 Further, having noted that an account of profits can
be awarded for a breach of confidence where the breach of
confidence constitutes a breach of a non-disclosure agreement, Lord
Nicholls suggested that it would be "nothing short of sophistry" to
say that an account of profits could be awarded with respect to the
breach of confidence but not with respect to the breach of contract.
99
Accordingly, in his view, "it would be only a modest step for the law
to recognise openly that, exceptionally, an account of profits may be
the most appropriate remedy for breach of contract."
100
Conceding that the main argument against recognition of the
availability of disgorgement relief was the concern that this would
induce an element of uncertainty into the law concerning commercial
contracts, Lord Nicholls expressed the view that these fears were not
well founded. Emphasizing that the account of profits would be
awarded only in exceptional cases, Lord Nicholls indicated that
"[n]ormally the remedies of damages, specific performance and
injunction, coupled with the characterisation of some contractual
obligations as fiduciary, will provide an adequate response to a
breach of contract."'
0 1
Indeed, he went on to suggest that it would only be in
circumstances where such "remedies are inadequate" that an account
of profits could be awarded. 102  Although Lord Nicholls thus
signaled that disgorgement should be awarded only in exceptional.
circumstances, he went on to articulate a standard for the award of an
account of profits which is open-textured in the sense that it appears
to confer broad discretion to make such awards, the exercise of
which is neither structured nor confined by very precise guidelines.
Lord Nicholls reasoned as follows:
No fixed rules can be prescribed. The court will have
regard to all the circumstances, including the subject matter
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 397-98.
101. Id. at 398.
102. Id.
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of the contract, the purpose of the contractual provision
which has been breached, the circumstances in which the
breach occurred, the consequences of the breach and the
circumstances in which relief is being sought. A useful
general guide, although not exhaustive, is whether the
plaintiff had a legitimate interest in preventing the
defendant's profit-making activity and, hence, in depriving
him of his profit.
It would be difficult, and unwise, to attempt to be more
specific.'
0 3
The proposed discretion to award an account of profits for
breach of contract thus appears to be largely unstructured. However,
some guidance with respect to its exercise may be gleaned from Lord
Nicholls's treatment of various suggestions, with respect to the
availability of disgorgement by the Court of Appeal in Blake, and
from the reasons offered by Lord Nicholls and Lord Steyn for the
making of such an award on the particular facts of the Blake case
itself.
In the Court of Appeal, Lord Woolf M.R. suggested that there
were two circumstances in which disgorgement relief might be
particularly appropriate.104 Neither suggestion was accepted by the
House of Lords. The first suggestion concerned cases of "skimped
performance."'10 5 In the oft-cited American illustration 10 6 of this
phenomenon, a provider of firefighting services had skimped on the
number of firefighters and horses and the length of hose required by
the agreement. 10 7 Nonetheless, the plaintiff customer suffered no
property loss as a result of the lower level of firefighting services
provided. The plaintiff sought to recover the supplier's saved
expenses, but was awarded merely nominal damages by the
American court.
For Lord Woolf, recovery of the saved expenses in such
circumstances would have been appropriate. In Lord Nicholls's
103. Id.
104. See Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [1998] 1 All E.R. 833, 845-46 (C.A. 1997)
(Eng.).
105. Id.
106. See City of New Orleans v. Firemen's Charitable Ass'n, 9 So. 486 (La.
1891).
107. See id.
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view, however, compensatory damages calculated on an expectancy
basis would meet the needs of justice in such a case. 108 Under the
normal calculation of expectancy damages, the customer would be
entitled to the difference in value between the service as promised
and the service as provided. It would be unnecessary, therefore, to
invoke the disgorgement measure to provide appropriate relief. The
second suggestion made by Lord Woolf was that disgorgement
should be available in circumstances where a defendant has obtained
a profit by doing the very thing he contracted not to do.' 0 9 Blake
promised not to disclose official information."10 He profited by
doing the very thing he had promised not to do and thus should be
required to disgorge his profits."' Lord Nicholls, however, was of
the view that this was too broad a test for the application of the
disgorgement remedy and ran the risk of embracing "all express
negative obligations."
112
The House of Lords did agree, 113 however, with three further
suggestions made by the Court of Appeal 14 with respect to
circumstances which would not be sufficient in themselves for
departing from the general principle of compensatory damages on an
expectancy basis. The House of Lords and the Court of Appeal
agreed that the mere fact that a particular breach was cynical and
deliberate would not be a sufficient basis for disgorgement.' This
suggests that the moral quality of the defendant's act is not
considered to be, by itself at least, a basis for disgorgement. It may
well be, however, that the moral quality will count as a relevant
consideration to one of the "circumstances of the breach" alluded to
in the passage from Lord Nicholls set out above. Further, the House
of Lords agreed with Lord Woolf s suggestion that the mere fact that
the breach had enabled the defendant to enter into a more profitable
contract elsewhere would not be a sufficient basis for disgorgement,
nor would the fact that, by entering a new and more profitable
108. See Blake, [2000] 4 All E.R. at 398.
109. See Blake, [1988] 1 All E.R. at 846.
110. See id.
111. Seeid.
112. Blake, [2000] 4 All E.R. at 398. Lord Steyn, on the other hand, appears
more accepting of this approach. See id. at 403-04.
113. See id. at 398-99.
114. See Blake, [1988] 1 All E.R. at 845.
115. See Blake, [2000] 4 All E.R. at 398-99.
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contract, the defendant had made himself incapable of performing his
contract with the plaintiff.' 
16
On this basis it would appear that the phenomenon of efficient
breach has not been precluded by the Blake doctrine. It may be
another matter, however, where a seller's refusal to deliver and
subsequent resale is provoked by a desire to exploit unexpected
volatility in the marketplace. The Israeli Supreme Court has
awarded disgorgement relief in such circumstances, 117 and it may be
argued that this additional factor lifts the breach out of the category
of mere resale at a higher price which was the subject of discussion
in Blake.
Further guidance with respect to the likely range of availability
of the disgorgement remedy can be discerned from the manner in
which the doctrine is applied to the facts of the Blake case. Lord
Nicholls emphasized, in stating the test for making disgorgement
relief available, that "whether the plaintiff had a legitimate interest in
preventing the defendant's profit-making activity" would provide a
useful general guide.1 18 In apparent application of this principle to
the Blake facts, Lord Nicholls placed considerable emphasis on the
importance of confidentiality in the work of the security and
intelligence services. "Secret information is the lifeblood of these
services."' 19 Disclosures such as Blake's could undermine the
complete confidence that members of the service need to have in
each other and the willingness of informers to cooperate with the
service, thus threatening to jeopardize the very effectiveness of the
service. This particular breach of contract, then, constituted a threat
to the effectiveness of an important public institution. Further, Lord
Nicholls mentioned in passing that the conduct constituted the
commission of a criminal offense. 120 Perhaps more importantly, it
116. See id.
117. This decision has been translated into English. See Adras Bldg.
Material Ltd. v. Harlow & Jones GmbH, 1995 RESTITUTION L. REv. 235
(discussing whether the law of unjust enrichment applies in a situation in
which there was a contract between the parties); Daniel Friedmann, Restitution
of Profits Gained by Party in Breach of Contract, 104 L.Q. REv. 383 (1988)
(discussing the importance of the issue of restitution of profits gained by a
party due to breach of a contract in Adras Bldg. Material Ltd.).
118. Blake, [2000] 4 All E.R. at 398.
119. Id. at 399.
120. Arguably, this might constitute a separate and independent ground for
disgorgement relief.
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was Lord Nicholls's view that Blake's undertaking, though not
precisely a fiduciary obligation, "was closely akin to a fiduciary
obligation, where an account of profits is a standard remedy in the
event of breach.' 2' In his concurring opinion, Lord Steyn agreed
that the present case is "closely analogous to that of fiduciaries."'
122
It may well be, therefore, that a critical indicator of the
appropriateness of disgorgement relief will be the extent to which the
breach of contract in question engages the kinds of policy
considerations that have traditionally provided the foundation for the
development of the law of fiduciary obligation and its associated
remedies. Broadly speaking, the law of fiduciary relations has as its
purpose the facilitation and protection of relationships of trust and
confidence, based in part on the assumption that the promotion of
such relationships serves legitimate social ends. 123  Though
technically not a breach of fiduciary obligation, Blake's wrongdoing
does appear to be of a very similar kind.
Perhaps the analogy of fiduciary obligation will prove to be an
important one in the context of interpretation and application of the
reasoning in Blake for future cases. It must be remembered,
however, that the House of Lords took some care to avoid imposing
rigid constraints on the availability of disgorgement. As Lord
Nicholls said, "[n]o fixed rules can be prescribed." 124 In the same
vein, Lord Steyn noted that "[e]xceptions to the general principle that
there is no remedy for disgorgement of profits against a contract
breaker are best hammered out on the anvil of concrete cases."
' 125
The reach of the disgorgement remedy for breach of contract in
English law thus remains, to some extent, a matter of speculation.
However, a careful examination of the pre-Blake instances of
121. Blake, [2000] 4 All E.R. at 400.
122. Id. at 404.
123. See Soulos v. Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 217, 236 (Can.) (explaining
that the objective of imposing fiduciary duties is to "maintain the integrity of
institutions dependent on trust-like relationships.").
124. Blake, [2000] 4 All E.R. at 398.
125. Id. at 403. Lord Steyn, however, appeared to accept that there was
some validity to the test proposed in argument by the Solicitor General to the
effect that disgorgement would be appropriate where "(1) [t]here has been a
breach of a negative stipulation," (2) the perpetrator has profited by doing the
very thing he promised not to do, (3) the victim has more than a pecuniary
interest in performance, and (4) neither specific performance nor an injunction
would provide an effective remedy in the circumstances. Id.
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disgorgement relief, together with the reasoning in Blake itself, may
be thought to suggest that the remedy is not likely to be available
beyond the range of fact situations in which, as in Blake, the breach
of contract at issue is in conflict with important social values.
Blake's breach of contract threatened the viability of the nation's
security service, and it may have been a crime. It was close to
breach of fiduciary obligation and breach of confidence and might be
thought to undermine the viability or value of confidential
relationships. Thus, it might be said that his breach was of such a
character that it engaged the principle that a wrongdoer should not be
permitted to profit from his wrongdoing. The conduct was not a
mere breach of contract and was wrongful in the requisite sense.
It is more difficult, though perhaps not impossible, to explain the
earlier cases on this basis. Certainly, British Motor Trade
Association v. Gilbert126 is a case in which the defendant's breach
threatened the viability of a socially useful scheme. The cases
concerning sale of land subject to a constraint on development are
more difficult, though perhaps it may be suggested the vendor's
insistence on the constraint is more likely to be consistent with the
public interest than with the purchaser's desire to maximize profit.
Lake v. Bayliss,127 allowing disgorgement in a land sale context,
is again more difficult unless one takes the view that the general
availability of specific performance against the vendor indicates a
strong public interest in the enforcement of such bargains. However,
as one travels down this path of explaining the existing instances of
disgorgement for breach of contract on the basis that it lifts the
profits from contract breaches which constitute anti-social behavior,
one waters down the anti-social requirement. Indeed, one appears to
again approach the point at which the test of inadequacy of damages
as a remedy becomes a useful indicator of the situations in which
disgorgement becomes a serious possibility.'
28
126. [1951] 2 All E.R. 641 (Ch.) (Eng.).
127. [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1073 (Ch.) (Eng.).
128. The first trial decision applying Blake appears difficult to defend on any
basis other than the inadequacy of damages test. See Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd.
v. Niad Ltd., 2001 WL 1476190 (Ch.) (Eng.) (unreported) (defendant service
station participates in plaintiff oil company's "Pricewatch" scheme; defendant
receives discount on gasoline supplied by plaintiff and agrees to reduce prices
to the consumer upon the plaintiff's direction in order to remain competitive;
defendant breaks contract by failing to make the price reductions required by
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Tentatively, however, apart from its uses in the pre-Blake cases,
disgorgement is likely to be made available, as in Blake, in cases
where the conduct is sufficiently similar to breach of fiduciary
obligation, breach of confidence, tort, and crime. In these contexts,
the conduct engages the policy considerations underlying
disgorgement and the applicable wrongdoing principles.
V. CONSEQUENTIAL ISSUES
In other common law jurisdictions of the British
Commonwealth, a number of issues arise in the wake of Blake. Is
the Blake doctrine likely to travel well? How will the remedy work?
Is apportionment a possibility? Will it bring into play the possibility
of constructive trust?
With respect to the Canadian scene, it is likely that Canadian
courts will follow the lead of the House of Lords in Blake and
explicitly recognize the availability of disgorgement relief for breach
of contract in exceptional circumstances. Indeed, recognition of the
availability of this form of relief has already, to some extent,
occurred. The Supreme Court of Canada has recently intimated that
such relief might be available. 129
Further, in Jostens Canada Ltd. v. Gibsons Studio Ltd. ,13 the
British Columbia Court of Appeal awarded disgorgement relief for
breach of contract. The defendant had, for some years, served as the
local area representative for the plaintiff, a national firm of school
photographers. In this capacity, the defendant contracted with local
schools to provide student and class photographs. Prior to the expiry
of the then current agreement in June of 1993, the defendant booked
contracts with its various customers for the school year to come.
Although the plaintiff attempted to renew the contract for the next
school year, the defendant informed the plaintiff, shortly before the
plaintiff; defendant held unjustly enriched by the discounts and the excess
charges to consumers).
129. See Bank of Am. Canada v. Mut. Trust Co., [2002] 211 S.C.R. 44
(Can.). It is not clear that the controversial nature of the proposition was
drawn to the court's attention in this case, the issue at hand being the
appropriateness of awarding compound interest. But see Mitchell Mclnnes,
Restitutionary Damages for Breach of Contract: Bank of America Canada v.
Mutual Trust Co., 37 CAN. Bus. L.J. 125 (2002).
130. [1999] 174 D.L.R. (4th) 351 (B.C. Ct. App.) (Can.) (reporting
subsequent proceedings in the same matter that determine quantum of relief).
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beginning of the fall term, that it did not intend to renew their
agreement. During the summer months, the defendant informed the
schools with which it had negotiated contracts that it was severing its
relationship with the plaintiff and, in due course, enjoyed success in
inviting their support in doing so.
The plaintiff sued for disgorgement of the profits thereby
secured through what was alleged to be a breach of fiduciary duty,
placing reliance on a provision of the agreement which referred to
the defendant as the "agent" of the plaintiff. The trial judge
dismissed the claim, holding that the mere use of agency language
did not constitute a relationship of agency in the legal sense and that
the relationship was not fiduciary in character. 131 Although this
finding was not disturbed on appeal, the court of appeal held that the
agreement contained an implied term imposing an obligation of
"good faith and fidelity" upon the defendant. 132 The defendant had
breached this term and, moreover, had breached a contractual
obligation to "devote its full time and best efforts ... to the
promotion of [the plaintiff's] business"'133 by taking unto itself
business which it had booked prior to the expiry of the agreement.
On this basis, in the court's view, the plaintiff was entitled "either to
damages at law for breach of that clause of the contract or in equity
to an account ofprofits acquired by the breach."134
Although the court did not explore at length the innovative
nature of this relief, the decision is certainly consistent with the
reasoning in Blake. The case is also similar to Blake in the respect
that the relationship between the parties, though not held to be
fiduciary in character, is evidently closely akin to a fiduciary
relationship. Also, the analogy of the fiduciary obligation appears to
have played a significant role in the reasoning of the court.
Support for the availability of disgorgement in breach of
contract cases in Canadian law can also be drawn, as it was in Blake,
from the existence of the pre-Blake lines of authority described
above, which award gains-based relief in breach of contract cases.
There is no reason to doubt that the pre-Blake English doctrine also
constitutes a good Canadian law and the decision in Arbutus Park
131. See id. at 355-56.
132. Id. at 352-53.
133. Id. at 354 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
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Estates Ltd. v. Fuller 35 is a clear authority to this effect. Perhaps the
most important consideration in support of our tentative view that
Canadian courts are likely to adopt the approach to disgorgement
taken in Blake, however, is the recognition of the availability of
punitive or exemplary damages in claims for breach of contract
under Canadian common law. 1
36
A central pillar of the traditional reluctance to recognize the
disgorgement remedy has been the assumption that damages for
breach of contract should not be enlarged in order to effect a greater
deterrence to breach of contract than is posed by the prospect of
compensatory damages. Once it is recognized that punitive damages
may be awarded in a breach of contract claim, this objection to
disgorgement falls away. Indeed, disgorgement relief may appear to
be simply a sharper and more appropriate instrument for providing a
disincentive for the particular breach of contract in issue. Thus, at
the very least, it appears likely that disgorgement relief will be
considered to be available in situations where the breach of contract,
in the words of the test for awarding exemplary damages, "is of such
nature as to be deserving of punishment because of its harsh,
vindictive, reprehensible and malicious nature."'137 More generally,
however, recognition of the relevance of deterrence in fashioning
remedies for breach of contract strengthens the argument for explicit
recognition of the disgorgement remedy in exceptional cases.
Assuming that disgorgement is a remedy available in breach of
contract cases under Canadian law, two further questions should be
considered. The first question is whether, in fashioning
disgorgement relief, courts should attempt to make an apportionment
of the profits recoverable where a portion of the profits are
attributable to the breach and another portion may appropriately be
considered to be attributable to the efforts, expense, or expertise of
the defendant.
Apportionment is likely to occur in some cases, at least, if only
by indirect means. As has been suggested, careful application of the
135. [1977] 74 D.L.R. (3d) 257 (B.C. Sup. Ct.) (Can.).
136. See Vorvis v. Ins. Corp. of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085, 1107 (Can.)
(holding that it is possible, although rare, to award punitive damages in
contract cases).
137. Id. at 1107-08; see also Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 209 D.L.R.
(4th) 257, 290 (Can.).
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notion of "causation" may be utilized to isolate recovery to those
profits that are fairly attributable to the breach itself. 38 Similarly,
apportionment may result from focusing recovery on the expenses
saved by the perpetrator as a result of the breach.
In Surrey County Council,139 the plaintiff was allowed to recover
only that portion of the defendant's profits which represented the
saved expense of not having to purchase from the plaintiff a release
from the restriction on development. 140 The actual award was five
percent of the profits made by the defendant in constructing a larger
development. 141 Apportionment should also be possible by direct
means, however. Apportionment is a familiar concept within the
remedy of account of profits as it is awarded in the context of
intellectual property cases. 142 The analogy of apportionment in the
intellectual property context may be particularly appealing in breach
of contract cases raising similar issues. Assuming that courts do
possess a discretion to apportion profits, it is nonetheless unlikely
that apportionment will occur in cases where the defendant's
misconduct is particularly egregious. Thus, it is not surprising that
the possibility of apportionment was not considered in Blake.
The second question is whether, on the assumption that
disgorgement relief may be available in exceptional cases of breach
of contract, the disgorgement remedy may take the form of a
constructive trust. Disgorgement by means of the constructive trust
is a familiar remedy in the context of breach of fiduciary obligation
and, in Canada at least, in the context of breach of confidence.1 43 It
would be surprising, therefore, if constructive trust relief was not
considered to be potentially available in cases like Blake and Jostens,
which are closely akin to cases of fiduciary breach and, in Blake at
least, breach of confidence. More generally, however, with the
recognition, for purposes of Canadian law, of the remedial nature of
138. See Restitutionary Damages, supra note 8, at 149-51.
139. [1993] 1 W.L.R. 1361 (C.A.) (Eng.).
140. See id. at 710.
141. See id.
142. See D. VAVER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 262, 265-67 (1997).
143. See, e.g., Lac Minerals Ltd. v. Int'l Corona Res. Ltd., [1989] 2 S.C.R
574, 577 (Can.) (stating that a "constructive trust was the only just remedy
here, regardless of whether this remedy was based on breach of confidence or
breach of a fiduciary relationship.").
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the constructive trust remedy, 144 there would appear to be no reason,
in principle, why a remedial constructive trust could not be imposed
in circumstances where the particular features of the constructive
trust remedy would effect a just result. For example, in a case where
the ill-gotten gains have been reinvested, the constructive trust may
perform a useful role in ensuring that the defendant is stripped of all
of the profits secured by the breach. 1
45
VI. CONCLUSION
My tentative conclusion is that the Blake doctrine, permitting
disgorgement relief in cases of breach of contract, will most likely be
applied in circumstances where the particular breach of contract is of
such a nature that it engages the policy values fostered by the
existing law of tort, crime, breach of confidence, and breach of
fiduciary obligation. When the contract breach is fairly considered
to engage these values, the breach is wrongful in a sense that brings
into play the principle that a wrongdoer shall not profit from his
wrongdoing. If this is correct, it appears likely that the Blake
doctrine will typically operate at the margins of the existing
applications of the wrongdoer principle, rather than providing a
springboard for a substantial restructuring of contract remedies.
Finally, if this prediction has merit, the question is whether the
likely range of activity for the Blake doctrine helps to determine
whether it is an unjust enrichment doctrine rather than an aspect of
the law of contract. Certainly, the House of Lords in Blake was not
attracted by the fence-sitting label of "restitutionary damages."
146
Ironically, perhaps, those who wish to wave the restitution banner
may draw support from Lord Mansfield's famous decision in Moses
v. Macferlan 4 7-- for some the very fons et origo of modem
restitutionary doctrine.
144. Canadian courts have, on occasion, awarded constructive trust relief
with respect to benefits conferred upon the perpetrator of a breach of contract
by the innocent party. See MADDAUGH & MCCAMUS, supra note 5, at 483-
678.
145. Cf Attorney Gen. for Hong Kong v. Reid, [1994] 1 A.C. 324 (P.C.
1993) (Eng.) (holding that a Crown servant who accepted bribes to purchase
properties held the bribe and any property acquired therewith on constructive
trust for the Crown).
146. Attorney Gen. v. Blake, [2000] 4 All E.R. 385,397 (H.L.) (Eng.).
147. 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
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Moses v. Macferlan could be considered to be a disgorgement
for breach of contract case, albeit of a rather unusual nature. The
unusual feature is that the claim concerned moneys paid by the
plaintiff, Moses, to the defendant, Macferlan. Moses had endorsed
four notes to Macferlan for the latter's convenience on the faith of
Macferlan's undertaking that he would not pursue Moses as an
endorser. 148 In breach of this agreement, Macferlan sued Moses on
the notes in the Court of Conscience. 149  Moses pleaded the
agreement in defense but the Court held it to be beyond its
purview. 150 Macferlan therefore prevailed on his contract claim
against Moses. Moses then brought a claim in King's Bench to
recover the moneys he had lost to Macferlan in the Court of
Conscience. 15' Lord Mansfield held that such a claim would lie, as
an alternative to a claim "on the agreement," and that Macferlan was
"obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund the
money." 152 Thus, this was not a claim for restitution of money paid
to the defendant in the performance of an agreement, the typical case
of restitution for breach of contract. Rather, it was Moses' claim for
profits acquired through breach, albeit profits extracted from the very
hide of Moses himself.
The restitutionary boundary claim for disgorgement for breach
of contract thus has a rather respectable pedigree. Yet, it must be
asked whether it is necessary to assign the doctrine exclusively to
either the restitutionary or the contractual domain. From one
perspective, the Blake doctrine appears contractual. It certainly
offers a remedy for breach of contract. From another perspective,
the Blake doctrine appears to be of a piece with other instances of
disgorgement relief, which are generally considered to be remedies
for a particular type of unjust enrichment.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 677.
152. Id. at 681.
